Richard Lemmens website

Copyright:
Attribution NonCommercial ShareAlike
This text content and maps on this page are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike license license. This means that: adapting the content is allowed; using the content for commercial purposes is not allowed; sharing and redistributing the content with others is allowed. If you do any of the above, you must attribute your copy to its creator, Richard Lemmens, and make sure any alterations and distributions are licensed in the same way as the original. More info about Creative Commons licenses can be found at the Creative Commons website.

Warmatrix

War Matrix - Russian Invasion of the Ukraine

Global Age 1991 CE - present, Wars and campaigns

Destruction in Bucha
Destruction in Bucha
The Russian invasion of the Ukraine is a dangerous conflict that distorted many a power balance.
From 1999 onwards, under the leadership of Vladimir Poetin, Russia set out to rebuild the power of the Soviet Union, using economic resources, political maneuvers and also military power. The country took two provinces from Georgia in 2008 and increased its influence in other former Soviet republics like Belorussia. When in 2014 the Ukrainians ousted the pro-Russian prime minister Viktor Yanukovych in the Orange Revolution, Russia responded by stealthily annexing the Crimea and sponsoring rebellions in the Donbas, starting an unofficial war with Ukraine. In 2022 it stepped up the conflict by launching a full scale invasion, aiming to conquer half, if not the entire country.
On paper Russia was the stronger party. It had amassed some 190,000 troops, 2/3 of its army, against a slightly higher number of Ukranian soldiers. However the attacker had a 5:1 advantage in tanks, 4:1 in armored vehicles, 5:1 in guns, 16:1 in helicopters and 10:1 in aircraft, while its Black Sea navy was up against a Ukranian navy with only two warships. Back in 1990 Ukraine had given up its nuclear weapons from the Soviet era in return for guarantees on its territorial integrity. Now it bitterly regretted that decision.
The invasion targeted the Ukraine from three sides: from the north towards Kiev; from the east towards Kharkiv and the western Donbas region; from the south towards Kherson and Odessa. Analists pointed out that there were not enough Russian soldiers to occupy the entire Ukraine, yet that was not what Russia was aiming for. It tried to achieve a quick war, by dropping paratroopers at strategic points and paralyzing the Ukranian government and military, taking key cities, hoping to incite an anti-government rebellion and backing it up by ground troops. However the forward probes were repulsed, the rebellion never materialized, the advance of the armor was slow and soon Russian logistics proved inadequate. The column that advanced towards Kiev from the north got stuck and was decimated by drones and Ukranian soldiers. Anti-tank weapons and drones destroyed many Russian tanks, while the Ukranian air defenses prevented Russia from gaining the air superiority that it needed. Russia was afraid to engage in bloody urban fighting and like in Syria, shelled the cities with artillery instead, causing widespread destruction and many civilian casualties.
The conflict is an example of modern warfare which does not only include conventional battles but also cyberwarfare and mass propaganda. Russia has never called it a war, but instead uses the term 'special military operation'. Like in Syria, the civilian population has suffered disproportionally. Almost 10% of them fled westwards, despite attacks from the Russian army on refugees near the frontline.
Russia's strategic goal was to make Ukraine, which was inching towards Europe, Russian again, showing the western powers that it was not to be messed with. However the invasion backfired, with Europe and the USA rallying, partially choking Russia with economic sanctions and stepping up defense budgets. Europe is finally decreasing its reliance on Russian fossil fuels, but while alternatives are not yet in place, still buys them, financing Russia. The western states support Ukraine with intelligence, money and weapons, while refraining from becoming full partner in the conflict, which would put two sides with nuclear weapons against each other.
After three years of fighting Russia suffered possibly 100,000 deaths against 65,000 on the Ukranian side. Russia maintains an advantage in equipment, but suffers from a flawed chain of command and low morale amongst its soldiers. It has been forced to tap its strategic reserves, even declaring a partial mobilization, while Ukraine is at near full mobilization. Both sides are weary, low on ammunition and manpower. In the autumn of 2022 the dream of taking Kiev had been abandoned, but in the south and east Russia has taken about 15% of the land surface of Ukraine. Ukraine launched an offensive in 2023 which failed; Russia has since then been advancing, though slowly and at high cost to its army; Ukraine occupies some Russian territory near Kursk. Russia mercilessly bombs Ukrainan infrastructure and civilians, hoping to break the morale of the defenders and consolidating its gains in negotations, while the Ukraine strikes Russian military infrastructure. The war has descended into a stalemate, effectively becoming a slogging match that in many respects reflects the fighting in the west in World War I. That stalemate can still be broken when one side manages to tip the balance in ammunition, air superiority and morale. Russia, aiming for a war of attrition, is in a position of long term advantage, though if the west would step up its war efforts the tide could easily swing the other way.